Jon Stewart & The News Team Recap the Endless War in Iran Pt. 2 | The Daily Show



The Iran War has gone from Trump threatening to “obliterate them” to saying “it’s a little bit unfair” for Iran not to have some nuclear missiles. Jon Stewart and The Best F**king News Team dive into the memorandum Trump signed at the G7 in France, including a $300 billion reconstruction plan, the potential release of billions in frozen Iranian assets, and a deal that doesn’t mention ballistic missiles, the very thing the war was supposedly about. Plus, America’s commander in chief promotes a White House UFC fight with $12,000 “Freedom 250” gold coins and touts a ceasefire agreement that felt a lot like paying the check after dinner. #DailyShow #IranWar #Trump #JonStewart

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29 Comments

  1. Spain is the world's largest producer of olive oil by a massive margin.
    Global Market Share: Spain typically generates 40% to 50% of the world's olive oil supply each year.
    Annual Output: It produces between 1 million and 1.8 million metric tons in strong harvest years, which is more than the next several largest producing countries combined.
    Key Region: The majority of Spanish olive oil comes from the southern region of Andalusia—specifically the province of Jaén, which is often called the "Olive Oil Capital of the World".

  2. "bomb a country into a crop buying spree"
    I mean, Britain did something similar with China in the past… and the crop was being made into a drug.

  3. Ukraine's rebuilding is not simply a contest between Russian and American companies; the reconstruction market involves Ukrainian businesses, American and European corporations, international financial institutions, foreign governments, and major construction and engineering firms, with the key distinction being between those financing reconstruction, those controlling contracts and procurement, and those actually performing the work. While the war continues, some projects are already receiving funding and being built, but the much larger reconstruction market remains dependent on security, available financing, and future procurement decisions. On the American financial and investment side, BlackRock, led by CEO Larry Fink, has been involved in discussions about mobilizing private capital for Ukraine's recovery, although that does not establish ownership of reconstruction projects or the award of construction contracts. Citigroup, led by CEO Jane Fraser, hosted a September 2026 meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and business leaders to discuss reconstruction, while Franklin Templeton, led by CEO Jenny Johnson, participated in investment discussions without that participation alone proving a specific construction award. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) provides development-finance and investment support and is central to the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund framework, giving it a role in determining which investments may receive financial backing rather than physically rebuilding cities. Other American participants included Lazard, Macquarie, State Street, and McKinsey & Company, although attendance at investment discussions does not establish control over reconstruction or ownership of particular contracts. On the Ukrainian side, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leads national political negotiations with foreign governments and investors; Oleksii Kuleba, Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration, coordinates restoration policy and infrastructure priorities; and Serhii Sukhomlyn, head of the State Agency for Restoration, is involved in public infrastructure implementation, project management, procurement, and coordination with international funders. These officials matter because foreign capital does not automatically become a construction contract: government priorities, project approvals, tender rules, and financing conditions influence which companies can compete. Among companies and projects with documented financing or cooperation arrangements, Ukrenergo received a €90 million European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loan agreement in 2026 to reconstruct selected electricity substations; OKKO Group and GNG Group secured a €50 million EBRD financing agreement supporting the development and construction of a 189-megawatt wind farm; and Poland's Budimex, Polimex Mostostal, and AMW SINEVIA signed a cooperation agreement in May 2026 to prepare for prospective Ukrainian infrastructure reconstruction projects. Denmark's Vestas has been identified as a wind-turbine supplier in the broader recovery market, while France's Schneider Electric has been associated with electricity-grid modernization opportunities. These examples illustrate how an international lender can finance an approved project, a Ukrainian operator or private developer can implement it, and contractors and equipment suppliers can perform the work, with the lender, project owner, and builder occupying different positions in the chain. The European Union and international financial institutions are equally important because reconstruction will not be financed by American money alone: the European Commission coordinates EU support through the €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027 and its Ukraine Investment Framework, which is designed to mobilize public and private investment; the EBRD finances Ukrainian businesses, energy companies, and infrastructure; the European Investment Bank (EIB) supports infrastructure and public services, including through EU-backed guarantees; and the World Bank participates in assessing reconstruction needs and financing recovery projects. A joint February 2026 assessment estimated Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction needs at approximately $588 billion over ten years. Russia occupies a different position because it is waging the war that has destroyed much of the infrastructure being assessed for reconstruction. The sources reviewed did not establish Russian companies as leaders of the internationally financed reconstruction framework described here. Russian businesses may have interests in occupied territories or assets affected by the war, but that is not equivalent to winning legitimate Ukrainian government reconstruction contracts; Russian ownership, sanctions status, territorial control, and the legal validity of any purported contract must be examined individually. The overall power structure can therefore be mapped across four interconnected levels: governments and public institutions, including the Ukrainian government, the U.S. government, and EU member states; financing and investment intermediaries, including the DFC, EBRD, EIB, World Bank, private banks, and investment firms; project owners and procurement authorities, including Ukrainian ministries, the State Agency for Restoration, public utilities, and private developers; and companies receiving the work, including construction firms, engineering companies, energy suppliers, and materials manufacturers. Some projects combine these roles or bypass intermediaries, so each arrangement must be examined separately. For this investigation, BlackRock, Citi, and the DFC belong primarily on the financing and investment side of the map; Ukrainian agencies and utilities belong on the government and project-implementation side; and construction firms belong on the delivery side. The next step is to trace three things for every major project: the contract, identifying the company that actually won the tender, the contract value, and the signatories; the ownership, identifying the company's owners, board members, subsidiaries, joint ventures, and foreign investors; and the money, identifying which government or bank supplied the funds, what conditions apply, and which companies ultimately receive payments. This distinction is essential to determining whether an American, Ukrainian, or European company is merely pursuing an opportunity, has secured financing, or has actually won the construction work. It also prevents a company's appearance at an investment meeting from being mistaken for proof that it controls Ukraine's rebuilding.

  4. Non-Ukrainian actors in Ukraine's reconstruction include American and international financial institutions, investment firms, construction companies, energy suppliers, technology businesses, insurers, and government-backed financing organizations, but their involvement must be separated by what they have actually done. Among the American companies and financial institutions named as participants in the September 23–24, 2026, reconstruction and investment discussions were Citigroup (Citi), BlackRock, Franklin Templeton, Lazard, State Street, Jane Street, and McKinsey & Company, alongside Fairfax Financial Holdings of Canada and Australia's Macquarie Group. Other participants or organizations identified in connection with the discussions included Australia's Fortescue, FedEx, L3Harris Technologies, Northrop Grumman, Shield AI, Day & Zimmermann, and Prospera, whose precise legal identity must be verified before attributing a specific project to it. U.S. public-sector and business representatives included the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, represented by Deputy Under Secretary Jonathan Greenstein, and the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (URIF), a bilateral investment vehicle rather than an ordinary private construction company. Discussions covered investment, energy storage, defense technology, industrial development, and potential financing mechanisms; participation alone does not establish that any organization won a reconstruction contract. International financial institutions and risk-management companies are another important part of the structure: the World Bank, European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Commission, and UK Export Finance provide or facilitate development financing, loans, guarantees, and investment support, while Aon and MS Amlin are relevant to insurance and reinsurance capacity for war-related risks, which can influence whether private companies are willing to invest. Among foreign construction and engineering businesses, Poland's Budimex, Polimex Mostostal, and AMW SINEVIA signed a cooperation agreement on May 15, 2026, to prepare for potential Ukrainian infrastructure reconstruction projects, although that agreement does not prove they have secured the projects they hope to build. Other foreign industrial and energy companies with reported investment activity include GE Vernova, which signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine's DTEK for a proposed 650-megawatt gas-fired power plant; Fluence, which worked with DTEK on battery-storage installations; Octopus Energy, which announced a $100 million solar-and-battery initiative with DTEK; Denmark's Vestas, a wind-energy equipment supplier; France's Schneider Electric, a grid and energy-management technology provider; Germany's Notus Energy, a wind-power developer; and Urenco, which has nuclear-fuel supply arrangements with Ukraine's Energoatom supported by a UK Export Finance guarantee. Additional foreign investment firms identified by the Ukrainian presidency as participants in a February 2026 Munich meeting included Germany's Allianz, Deutsche Bank, HypoVereinsbank, and Siemens Energy; France's Amundi; Canada's Barrick Gold; and the American firms Moore Capital Management, New York Life Investments, PIMCO, and Relativity Space. Their attendance indicates participation in discussions about investment and recovery, particularly energy and infrastructure, but does not establish that each company holds a construction contract. I have not established a Russian company among the named participants in these reconstruction investment meetings or the foreign contractors listed here; that does not rule out Russian-linked business interests in Ukrainian assets or occupied territories, which require separate investigation. To determine who will actually receive reconstruction money and potentially control the resulting infrastructure and assets, the evidence must be organized into five categories: foreign companies that attended meetings; companies that signed memoranda or investment agreements; companies that received financing or guarantees; companies that won tenders and hold signed contracts; and the ultimate owners, major shareholders, and politically connected executives behind those businesses. The last two categories are the most important because meeting attendance demonstrates access to discussions, financing demonstrates access to capital, and a signed contract establishes a more direct claim to paid work. Only by tracing the contract, ownership, financing, payments, and eventual control of each asset can we distinguish companies exploring opportunities from those actually positioned to profit from Ukraine's reconstruction.

  5. You're pointing to a structural problem with public money: taxpayers can finance a war, military assistance, or a foreign recovery effort while private companies, investors, and their owners capture a substantial portion of the resulting revenue, meaning the public cost and private benefit do not automatically flow back to the same people. You're also identifying a second issue: defense contracts, lobbying networks, business relationships, and supply arrangements often predate a president's administration, so a change in leadership does not necessarily mean those relationships began under the new president; existing arrangements may simply continue, expand, or change direction. Investigating this requires tracing money from government appropriations and original contracts through corporate payments, ownership structures, and the ultimate distribution of profits. In the case of Israel, the United States has maintained a long-term military financing relationship across multiple administrations. According to the Congressional Research Service's May 28, 2025, report, cumulative U.S. bilateral assistance and missile-defense funding for Israel totaled approximately $175 billion in nominal dollars over the historical period covered by its accounting. The 2016 U.S.–Israel memorandum of understanding committed the United States to $38 billion in military assistance for fiscal years 2019–2028, subject to congressional appropriations, and Congress approved additional funding in 2024. The financial mechanism is straightforward: Congress appropriates taxpayer money for military assistance; authorized government programs fund or facilitate eligible purchases; Israeli procurement authorities purchase equipment, including from American defense contractors; and those contractors receive revenue that can benefit employees, suppliers, and shareholders. American taxpayers do not automatically receive a refund of the original expenditure or a proportional share of the contractors' profits. The U.S. Commerce Department has documented direct-commercial-contract arrangements through which Israeli defense procurement uses U.S.-owned companies, and the reported allocation of roughly one-third of Israel's annual Foreign Military Financing toward direct commercial procurement illustrates how public financing can support private business revenue. Such spending can also generate American employment, industrial capacity, and strategic benefits, but those benefits are not equivalent to returning the money directly to taxpayers, and whether they justify the expenditure is a separate question. Ukraine presents another important case through the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund agreement signed on April 30, 2025. Under the framework described by the Ukrainian government, Ukraine contributes 50% of specified future revenues from newly issued licenses for critical-mineral extraction and oil and gas exploration, while existing projects and already-budgeted revenues are excluded. The fund is intended to invest in Ukrainian extraction projects and reconstruction infrastructure, with profits reinvested in Ukraine during the first ten years and distributions potentially occurring afterward. The United States and Ukraine have equal decision-making representation under the arrangement. This is not simply an aid program; it is also an investment framework intended to generate economic returns. However, a financial return to a government-backed fund is not the same as a direct payment to individual American taxpayers. The public benefit depends on the fund's performance, governing terms, and eventual use or distribution of its returns. The fund's reported October 2, 2026, investment activity involving Ukrainian energy infrastructure and critical minerals provides concrete projects for further investigation. The central accountability question is therefore who pays, who receives the money, who owns the receiving companies, who influences the decisions, and what the public ultimately gets in return. Four connected ledgers can establish the picture: public expenditure, including taxpayer appropriations, military assistance, guarantees, loans, and reconstruction commitments; corporate revenue, including contract awards, payments, subcontractors, and profit margins; ownership and influence, including shareholders, executives, family-linked businesses, lobbying, and political contributions; and public return, including repayments, royalties, taxes, investment income, domestic employment, and measurable public benefits. The last ledger is essential because a company receiving government-funded revenue does not, by itself, prove corruption or an improper deal, just as the existence of jobs or claimed national-security benefits does not prove that taxpayers received value proportional to the expenditure. Establishing whether a particular arrangement unfairly transfers public resources into private hands requires comparing actual public costs, private returns, contractual conditions, ownership, and measurable outcomes. The documented intersection of public policy and private commercial interests in both the Israel relationship and Ukraine's reconstruction framework establishes a legitimate accountability question; proving that particular officials or companies improperly enriched themselves requires tracing specific contracts, beneficial ownership, payments, and decision-making records rather than relying on headline aid totals alone.

  6. This World War III will never end. Trump is making too much money off of it so he’s just gonna scream all kinds of words just to make him the center of attention. He will do anything he can to be noticed.

  7. Trump is going to cut visits to Spain? Really? The rest of the world is going to cut visits from him. His nonsensical threats, endless lies, in-your-face corruption, and outlandish gibberish are a constant embarrassment to the US.

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